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ABSENTEEISM
Absenteeism, as cause for discharge or other discipline, was
formerly left to the uncontrolled discretion of the employer. Un-
der collective bargaining agreements this right is limited.
The problem of balancing the right of the employer to disci-
pline employees for absenteeism and the right of employees to
"job security" becomes one of distinguishing between wrongful
and excusable absences.
There is no definite rule which may be applied to every case of
absence to determine whether disciplinary action is proper. Every
case involves variable factors: the existence of company rules or
of contract provisions in regard to absenteeism, whether notice
was required in case of absence and whether the proper notice
was given, whether prior warnings were required and given, the
reasons for absence and their sufficiency as an excuse, the em-
ployee's record of previous absences as an aggravating circum-
stance, and other surrounding circumstances going to aggrAva-
tion or mitigation. These are questions with which the arbitrator
commonly has to cope in a dispute arising out of discharge or
other discipline of an employee for absenteeism.
Union contracts often contain a clause governing the com-
pany's right to discharge or discipline for absenteeism. The
most common of these is the provision forbidding discharge
except for "just cause," with an exception for the case of pro-
bationary workers., But the term "just cause" is a broad one,
leaving much room for interpretation and conflict. This means,
of course, that the arbitrator may have to consider all the pre-
viously mentioned factors in order to arrive at what will be
considered a "just decision. " 2 For example, in one case in which
an employee was habitually absent the day after pay-day with
the excuse that he had slept, and where the company had warned
him personally that discipline would result if an absence without
sufficient excuse recurred, and such absence did recur, a three
day disciplinary lay-off was held to be justified3 But, on the
1. 5 Labor Equipment 66,003 (Prentice-Hall).
2. See In re Michigan Steel Casting Co. and United Automobile Workers
of America, Local 155 (CIO), 2 ALAA 67,652 (1947); In re Pittsburgh
Metallurgical Co., Inc. and United Mine Workers bf America, District 50,
12 LA 95 (1945).
3. In re Eagle-Pitcher Mining and Smelting Co. and International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (CIO), 2 ALAA 167,625 (1947).
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other hand, where the employer contended that all unauthorized
leaves are without "good cause," it was held that the discipline
based on this contention was not justified and would not be up-
held without further proof. In both of these cases, the only
contract provision invoked was the general one limiting dis-
charge and discipline to "just cause."
Many contracts contain more specific absenteeism provisions.
Contracts may provide a procedure for the employee to follow in
obtaining permission to be absent. In the contract involving the
Bell Aircraft Corporation, it was provided that an employee who
is absent for more than three days shall lose his seniority rights
upon failure of proper notice to the company or satisfactory
reason for the absence. An employee was absent for five con-
secutive days and upon return presented a doctor's certificate,
testifying to his illness and inability to work on the days absent.
Pursuant to the company's interpretation of the clause, the em-
ployee, having failed to notify within the three-day period, was
deprived of his seniority rights, as a result of which this em-
ployee was the first to be laid off when the company cut down on
employment. The arbitrator ordered that the employee be rein-
stated with back pay in the absence of impeachment of the doctor
as a witness, and held that the compliance with the requirement
of presenting a satisfactory reason for the absence was sufficient
to justify the absence under the contract.5 On the other hand,
arbitrators are unlikely to overrule the employer's decisions in
matters relating to absenteeism unless the contract has been
violated or there is evidence of an abuse of discretion. For ex-
ample, employees discharged for failing to notify their super-
visors when they were unable to appear for work have been
ordered reinstated if they had made some effort to notify or if
there is some doubt as to whether they did notify.6
In a case involving John Morrell & Co., a distinction was made
in imposing a penalty on one employee, who had failed to notify
the company of his absence, and another employee, who did send
such notice and was not penalized, although absence in both cases
4. In re Pittsburgh Metallurgical Co., Inc. and United Mine Workers of
America, District 50, 12 LA 95 (1945).
5. In re Bell Aircraft Corp. and United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 10 (CIO), 1 LA 281 (Date not available).
6. 5 Labor Equipment 66,011 (Prentice-Hall).
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was justified.7 In another case, a penalty was upheld when an
employee had notified the company of a one-day absence but had
failed to give additional notice when she found it necessary to
stay home another day.8 An unexplained absence may cause
great inconvenience to a company, especially if the employee
holds a key position; and, therefore, a company is justified in
presuming that such absence was not justified and a commensu-
rate penalty may be imposed. Notice is required regardless of
whether the reason for the absence is valid or will subject the
employee to discipline; and, in the latter case, the lack of notice
would be regarded as an aggravating circumstance permitting a
heavier penalty.,
On the other hand, contracts may require the employer to give
the employee warning before disciplinary action for absence is
taken. Arbitrators are generally reluctant to sustain discharges,
unless the employer shows sufficient evidence of misconduct and
unless he proves that he followed the established contract pro-
cedure in each case.,' In a number of cases the arbitrator has
refused to uphold the penalty imposed by the company on an
employee who had been absent without proper justification be-
cause the company had failed to warn the employee that his con-
duct (excessive or unjustified or unexcused absence) would re-
sult in disciplinary action if continued. It has been held that an
employee should be previously warned or reprimanded for poor
attendance before he is discharged for that reason, especially
where a certain amount of absence has been tolerated in the
past."1 In this case, the discharge was reversed and the employee
reinstated to his former position, because of the lack of previous
7. In re John Morrell & Co. and United Packinghouse Workers of Amer-
ica, Local I (CIO), 9 LA 931 (1948).
8. In re United States Rubber Co. and United Textile Workers of Amer-
ica (AFL), 3 ALAA 168,110 (1948).
9. In re American Steel and Wire Co. and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica (CI0), 12 LA 47 (1948).
10. 5 Labor Equipment 66,003 (Prentice-Hall).
11. In re International Association of Machinists and Office Employees
International Union, Local 30 (AFL), 7 LA 231 (1947); Accord: Crown
Cotton Mills and Textile Workers of America (CIO), 3 ALAA 68,107
(1948), where it was held that although, under the contract, habitual ab-
sence was a just cause for discharge, the company cannot discharge an
employee for excessive absence due to illness even though the illness is
brought on by drinking, if such absences have prior to this time been
tolerated without penalty.
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warning. In arriving at this conclusion, the arbitrator stated
that
An employer who has tolerated a certain amount of ab-
sences and tardiness in the past has a right to establish
more rigid standards for the future, but has no right to put
the new policy into effect without warning. "'
The purpose of a formal warning is to give an employee an
opportunity to better his attendance record before a penalty is
imposed. Therefore, under a contract permitting an employer
to demote or discharge an employee whose absences have ex-
ceeded a certain quota after the employee has been given formal
warning, the arbitrator decided that, in determining that em-
ployee's quota for the purpose of imposing a penalty, the com-
pany would be permitted to consider only those absences which
occurred after the formal warning. If the arbitrator had applied
a strict interpretation to this contract provision and had per-
mitted the company to determine the quota from the over-all
attendance record of the employee, the discharge would have
been proper. But under the liberal interpretation, the employ-
ee's reinstatement was ordered.12 In a decision involving the
United Auto Workers, the requirement of a warning before the
imposition of a penalty was carried even further. An employee
had been given a "final warning" that the next absence would
mean discharge. Subsequently, this employee was absent five
more times without any action being taken against him. On the
sixth occasion the employee was absent in the afternoon without
leave after he had been given permission to be absent in the
morning. This time the company discharged him; but its de-
cision was reversed upon arbitration because the company had
"lulled the employee into a false sense of security." The pre-
vious warning, which had gone unenforced, was not sufficient to
justify discharge later for a minor absence. 13 Although this
decision may be somewhat extreme, it is a clear indication of the
lenient attitude which some of the abitrators have taken in re-
versing discharges of employees based on absenteeism.
On the other hand, arbitrators have allowed proof of previous
warning as justification for disciplinary action. An interesting
11a. Ibid.
12. In re Pacific Mills and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254(CIO), 3 LA 141 (1946).
13. In re Michigan Steel Casting Co. and United Automobile Workers of
America, Local 155 (CIO), 2 ALAA 67,652 (1947).
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comparison may be drawn between the United Auto Workers
Case, supra, in which the employee was "lulled into a false sense
of security," after having been warned that future absence
would result in discharge, and a somewhat similar case. In the
latter case, the employee was habitually absent with the excuse
that he had "slept." He was warned that disciplinary action
would result if his absence with insufficient excuse should recur
and was given a three-day lay-off when he failed to heed the
warning. The punishment was imposed on the first occasion of
his absence after the warning, and the company's stand was
upheld by the arbitrator.14 The reasoning of the arbitrators in
these two cases is consistent. In another case, the contract re-
quired the employees to give twenty-four hours' advance notice
of contemplated absences and further required permission to be
absent from the foreman in order to avoid an AWOL status for
which punishment might be imposed. One of the employees,
despite the warning that he would be punished if he were again
AWOL, was absent without permission on a subsequent occasion.
In upholding the temporary lay-off, the arbitrator stated that
the previous warning gave the company a stronger case.1"
The predominant cause and the most popular "excuse" for
absence is illness, either of the employee himself or some member
of the immediate family. In passing upon the validity of such
excuses, the arbitrator must ask: Was there a bona fide illness?
Was the excuse sufficient? Was the contract provision complied
with? The decisions generally indicate that arbitrators have
interpreted provisions in regard to absence for illness with a
view most favorable to the employee. It appears that all doubt
as to the validity of the employee's excuse in the light of the
contract provisions has to be overcome in order to justify some
punishment by the company.16
14. In. re Eagle-Pitcher Mining and Smelting Co. and International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 429 (CIO), 2 ALAA
67,625 (1947).
15. In re Brown & Sharp Manufacturing Co. and International Associa-
tion of Machinists, 7 LA 134 (1947); Accord: In re United States Rubber
Co. and United Textile Workers of America (AFL), 3 ALAA 68,110
(1948), where an excuse which had justified one or two absences was in-
sufficient for a later absence after the employee had been warned that
excuse of sickness without medical certificate would no longer be taken,
and the discharge was upheld.
16. In re Chicago and Harrisburg Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of
America, 2 LA 56 (1945), where an employee did not lose his vacation pay
despite a five months' absence, which was excusable due to illness, although
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In determining the justification of a penalty imposed for ab-
senteeism, all the surrounding circumstances are to be taken into
account, including the employee's general employment record.17
Thus, in upholding the discharge for absenteeism of an employee,
who had on a previous occasion caused some difficulty at the
plant, the arbitrator held that an employee's past record cannot
be entirely disregarded in determining the fairness of a penalty
in a disciplinary case, stating that "Events occurring two
months before the suspension must be considered if they might
justify it."'
Furthermore, a company will not be forced to retain persons
the length of the absence was partly due to excessive drinking after his
injury and although the doctor's certificate accounted for only three months
of the absence, the employee having been sent home by the company for the
other two months because of his inability to work; In re Erie Resistor Corp.
and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 631
(CIO), 5 LA 161 (1946), where the contract provided that leaves of absence
would be required for absences of four or more days, and the arbitrator
held that the leave of absence rule should not be applied where an employee
was absent for four days due to illness and had notified her foreman on the
2d and 3d days but did not think it necessary to send notice that she would
need a fourth day off; In re Texas Textile Mills and Textile Workers Union
of America, Local 617 (CIO), 5 LA 762 (1946), where the contract pro-
vided that the company had a right to deny vacation bonuses where an
employee was absent for a certain number of days without "such excuse as
the company in its discretion shall consider sufficient," and the arbitrator
held that since the employee's foreman had by prior arrangement approved
of her absence for six days, the company must take the approval of the
foreman as sufficient excuse for the absence and cannot use such absence as
a basis for discipline; In re General Tire and Rubber Co. and Federal Labor
Union, Rubber Workers (AFL), 6 LA 918 (1947), where it was held that
where an employee, because of an erroneous interpretation of his rights
under the contract of employment, refused to work on Sunday and was
absent on that day, the company could not discipline him under a rule which
provided for strong punishment for disobedience to proper authority, but
could impose only the minor penalty provided for in the rule prohibiting
absence; In re United States Rubber Co. and United Textile Workers of
America (AFL), 3 ALAA 68,110 (1948), where it was held that a penalty
for failure to notify a company of an absence was not justified where the
employee had sent notice of her absence due to illness on two consecutive
working days but was absent a third day, because the company could rea-
sonably conclude that the employee was still ill without the otherwise re-
quired notice; In re Phelps-Dodge Corp. and Long Island Refinery Workers
(CIO), 3 ALAA 68,161 (1948), where a contract provided that seniority
would be broken for a three days unexplained absence (without notice) and
the employee notified the company of his illness on the first day of absence
and then was absent for nine consecutive days, the arbitrator held that the
lack of additional notice (every three days) was not cause for a penalty, as
the company was notified of the illness and the employee was absent for no
longer than a reasonable period of time.
17. Myron Gollub, Discharge for Cause (N. Y. Dept. of Labor 1948) 74.
18. In re Phelps-Dodge Corp. and United Electrical, Radio, & Machine
Workers, Local 430 (CIO), 2 ALAA 67,548 (1946).
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in their employ who have no value and perform no service. The
reported decisions on this point are few. There are some which
have held that the reasons for absence become immaterial where
the number of absences becomes so great that an employee's
services are of no value to the company. In a recent case, the
discharge of an employee was upheld although the particular
absence which precipitated the discharge was "necessary and
excusable," because the over-all attendance was so bad that the
employee became more of a burden than an asset to the com-
pany."9
As in our courts of equity, arbitration tribunals will avoid the
perpetration of an injustice on the parties. In In re Jobn MorreU
& Co.,20 three employees were each given a three-day suspension
for a relatively short period of absence. The first employee had
been with the company for over ten years. The reason for the
penalty in his case was that he had been absent on four scattered
days in order to visit a doctor to be treated for an ailment. Al-
though he had reported his absence, he was not excused. The
second employee also had a legitimate excuse for his absence,
but had failed to give notice of such to the company. The third
employee's excuse was invalid, and he had totally neglected to
give any notice of his absence. The circumstances of the first
case caused the suspension to be set aside, and the employee was
reinstated with back pay. In the second case, the punishment
was reduced; and in the third case it was permitted to stand as
being justified. The company rules had provided for suspension
and discharge of employees who accumulated a specified number
of absences, regardless of circumstances. Besides being in con-
flict with the contract provision providing for discharge only for
just cause, this rule was found unjustified and arbitrary, even
though the problem of absenteeism had risen to serious propor-
tions in the company. Although a company has a right to make
rules in furtherance of orderly conduct of the business, it must
take into consideration mitigating and extenuating circum-
19. In re Goodyear Clearwater Mills No. 2 and United Textile Workers
of America, Local 90 (AFL), 11 LA 419 (1948).
20. In re John Morrell and Company and United Packinghouse Workers
of America, Local 1 (CIO), 9 LA 931 (1948); Accord: In re Pacific Mills
and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254 (CIO), 3 LA 141 (1946)
where an employee was reinstated despite a two-year record of repeated
absences, because the absences were due to illness and hospitalization, and
the employee had a good record for nearly eighteen years.
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stances. Each case should be considered on its merits, and all
absent employees should not necessarily be punished equally.
Disciplinary action need not necessarily take the form of affir-
mative punishment. Frequently the withholding of a privilege
is more effective than another form of punishment; and an
arbitrator is more likely to sustain the former than the latter.
Thus, some union-management agreements have provisions
whereby such privileges as bonuses, vacation pay, and the right
to work over-time are denied to those employees who have
worked less than a certain prescribed minimum of hours per
year, regardless of the cause of their absences. In one contract,
the company was required to regulate wages so that employees
of "equal ability and responsibility" shall receive the same rate
above the minimum wage as better paid employees of no greater
competence and performing comparable work were receiving.
Here, the company properly denied the wage increase to an em-
ployee who was frequently absent, even though excused for ill-
ness, as this employee fell into a class of "lower responsibility"
even though he would be of equal ability. In support of the com-
pany's position, the arbitrator said, "absence of an employee is
upsetting to a company's production record regardless of cause."
The responsibility of an employee with a record of absence can-
not be equal to that of a worker with a steady record. 21
The right of management to take disciplinary measures against
its employees as a result of absence from work is limited under
21. In re Godfrey Conveyor Company and International Association of
Machinists, Local 163, 3 LA 757 (1946) ; Accord: In re Walworth Company
and United Steelworkers of America, Local 1275 (CIO), 5 LA 551 (1946),
where it was held that the company should have the right, because of the
admitted need of controlling absenteeism, to deny overtime to employees
regardless of seniority (which was required by rule), if the absence was
attributable to any reason other than those specified as "excusable"; In re
Texas Textile Mills and Textile Workers Union of America (CIO), 5 LA
762 (1946), where the contract provided that the company had the right to
deny vacation bonuses if the employee were absent for a certain number of
days without "such excuse as the company in its discretion shall consider
sufficient"; In re Reading Street Railway Company and Amalgamated
Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of
America, Division 1345 (AFL), 6 LA 860 (1947), in which a transit com-
pany contract provided that if an operator fails to take out his regular run,
and fails to show that it was for reasons beyond his control, he shall be
charged with a "miss," and that if he be charged with two or more "misses"
in one month, he shall be placed at the bottom of the extra operators list
for two days; In re Phelps-Dodge Corporation and Long Island Refinery
Workers (CIO), 3 ALAA 68,161 (1948), where the contract provided for
loss of seniority for three days' unexplained absence.
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collective bargaining agreements. A company cannot operate
without assurance that its employees will come to work with rea-
sonable regularity. The question thus arises as to how far a
company's right to discharge or discipline its employees for ab-
senteeism extends. As we have seen, the answer to this problem
is found in contract provisions and in the company rules, sub-
ject to their proper interpretation in the light of the reasons
offered by way of excuse, the employee's previous record of




Throughout the history of collective bargaining both labor
and management have realized the impossibility of smooth pro-
duction amid fights, heated arguments, and like disturbances.
It is thus a broad, general truth that an employer has the right
to discharge employees who participate in an actual fight. The
word "actual" is important, as some friction is to be expected
in the tense atmosphere of modern industrial plants. Lesser
breaches of proper decorum may, of course, result in disciplinary
action short of discharge, and, as we shall see, numerous mitigat-
ing circumstances qualify the rule stated.
It is difficult to isolate those arbitration decisions which im-
pose discipline for fights and altercations alone. Many such
affrays are apt to occur during the process of procuring some
collective bargaining advantages, and they frequently appear
during strikes or in connection with zealous solicitation of union
membership. An employer may entertain an ulterior motive and
disguise it as discipline for a fight or altercation. This discus-
sion, insofar as it is possible, will exclude the topics of coercion
and intimidation, destruction of property, inciting strikes and
boycotts-all of which are grounds for disciplinary action-and
discrimination against union members in disciplinary penalities,
evidence of which will make the penalty unjustified.
Disciplinary action by an employer for fights in the plant
may be based upon the bargaining contract, the past practice
of the company, or a general understanding among employees.,
1. -In re Dayton Malleable Iron Co., G.H.R. Foundry Division and United
Washington University Open Scholarship
